RECONSTRUCTING INSTITUTIONS AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT

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MOTIVATION

- Presumed causal link between institutional quality and development.
- Post-conflict areas replete with new institutional designs.
- Context renders assessment highly cumbersome.
- As a result, lack of consistent rigorous empirical evidence on institutional effect on governance, broader stability and economic well being.
VARIATION IN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF INTEREST

- Afghanistan (with Andrew Beath (WB) and Ruben Enikolopov (NES))
  - Counterinsurgency Context
  - Institution under Evaluation: CDD Program

- Bosnia-Herzegovina (with Marc Alexander (Stanford))
  - Ethnic Reintegration Context
  - Institution under Evaluation: First Integrated School
## OPERATIONALIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>500 villages; ~15,000 respondents</td>
<td>MRRD; WB; 7 local &amp; intl. NGOs</td>
<td>MRRD; WB; USAID; UNWFP; CIDA; IGC</td>
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<td>2 M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3 schools; 244 students</td>
<td>Mostar Municipality; OSCE</td>
<td>Russel Sage; Harvard Univ.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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AFGHANISTAN: CDD PROGRAM

- The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is Afghanistan’s largest development Program.
- Present in over 29,000 of Afghanistan’s 38,000 villages.
- Sponsored by international donors and run by MRRD.
- Implemented by NGOs in two main stages:
  - Election of Community Development Councils (CDCs) through secret-ballot election.
  - Project Selection.
The evaluation estimates impacts by collecting data over four years in 500 villages:

**250 NSP** (*treatment*) & **250 non-NSP** (*control*)

### Structure of Evaluation and Data Collection

- **Treatment Villages (NSP)**
  - Baseline Survey
  - Create CDCs
  - Select Projects
  - Implement Projects
  - 1st Follow-Up Survey
  - Projects Finished
  - 2nd Follow-Up Survey followed by Wheat Distribution

- **Control Villages (Non-NSP)**
  - Baseline Survey

### Timeline
- **Aug. – Sep. 2007**: Baseline Survey
- **May – Oct. 2009**: Projects Finished
- **May-Nov. 2011**: 2nd Follow-Up Survey followed by Wheat Distribution

### Key Steps
1. **Baseline Survey**
2. **Create CDCs**
3. **Select Projects**
4. **Implement Projects**
5. **1st Follow-Up Survey**
6. **Projects Finished**
7. **2nd Follow-Up Survey followed by Wheat Distribution**

### Similarity
- **Similarity of Treatment and Control Villages**
- **Interim Estimates**
- **Final Estimates**
SUBTREATMENT INTERVENTIONS

- Comparing two ways of electing councils
  - Single Member Districts
  - Multi-member Districts

- Comparing two ways of selecting projects
  - Referendum
  - Community Consultation Meeting
QUESTIONS FOR CDD EVALUATION

• Random assignment allowed us to examine range of impact-related questions:

  • Both substantive:
    • Can development aid reduce insecurity?
    • Can development aid improve women’s lives?

  • And operational:
    • Do electoral rules affect who gets elected?
    • Does method of project selection affect capture of resources?
NSP’S INTERIM IMPACTS

• NSP reduces insecurity by “winning hearts and minds.”

• NSP improves women’s economic and social status in the community.

• Higher quality council members if elected in multi-member districts.

• Lower levels of elite capture if projects selected via referenda.
NSP BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION

- Additional behavioral intervention to triangulate attitudinal results.

- Instead of behavioral games, we measured behaviors through real life event in rural Afghanistan.

- Compared outcomes in targeting and corruption during a food aid distribution, in villages with customary governance structures versus villages with democratically elected councils.
NSP BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION
FINDINGS

• Existence of multiple institutional structures can lead to institutional competition and underperformance.

• When in the lead, better aid targeting and higher participation.

• When not in the lead, higher levels of embezzlement and lower levels of participation.
OTHER RANDOMIZED CDD EVALUATIONS

• CDD increasingly popular: US$1.3 billion per year in lending in 2000-2008 by WB towards ~50 CDD projects.

• Fearon et al (2009) in Liberia find little impact on economic well being but some on governance.


• Humphreys et al (2012) in DRC find no effect.
BOSNIA: SCHOOL INTEGRATION

• Does post-conflict institutional integration improve inter-ethnic cooperation?

• Partial integration of high schools leaving student allocation to segregated or integrated environment to chance.

• N-person public goods game to assess institutional effect on people’s willingness to contribute to a public good.
FINDINGS OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION ON PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION IN BOSNIA

• On average, integrated institutions significantly increase contribution to public goods.

• Availability of sanctions in integrated institutions drives up contributions significantly but has no such effect in segregated institutions.

• Diversity of groups leads to lower public goods contribution only in the context of segregated institutions.
• RCTs on peer effects, teacher pupil ratios, teacher incentives, teacher performance, report cards, uniforms, textbooks, school meals, primary school deworming, educational incentives for parents and children. But not in conflict contexts.

• Exception: Burde and Linden (2012) who find that in Afghanistan village-based schools in villages that lack public schools, significantly increase enrollment and test scores and eliminate gender disparity.
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
NO ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTION

• Fetishization of new institutional frameworks post conflict, with emphasis on representation.

• New institutions not necessarily a panacea as indicated by variant results of CDD impact.

• Focus should be placed on specific contextual needs and interventions that also look to existing institutional frameworks and interactions between old and new.
PARTNERSHIP WITH ACADEMICS

• Organizations faced with post-conflict challenges often find it too cumbersome to pursue rigorous evaluation for their projects.

• Opportunities for organizations to link up with academics who can design optimal evaluation relevant to the context taking advantage of existing discontinuities and exogenous variation.

• Academics can also raise considerable funds, allowing program to afford better assessment than its budget would allow.
BETTER COORDINATION FOR REPLICATION

• Hard to generalize or even compare findings of studies that look at post-conflict institutions as different:
  • Context
  • Intervention
  • Measures

• Replication remains very important and requires higher levels of coordination in interventions studied as well as in indicators and measures employed.
MORE SHARING

• Notable progress in sharing research designs.

• Posting of pre-analysis plans also important in protecting from data mining and reporting bias.

• But too many people in the field still facing same logistical and operational problems because not enough discussion on realities of implementation in post-conflict context.

• EGAP, JPAL and other venues should encourage more public sharing on field challenges pertaining to better access, more appropriate enumeration, better human subjects protection.