Business Education for Microcredit Clients in Peru

 
Policy Issue:

Microfinance has generated worldwide enthusiasm as a potential answer to economic development and poverty reduction. But high default risk and unproductive use of loaned funds plagues many programs. A significant debate exists within the microfinance community as to whether lenders should focus solely on the lending business, or whether they should take advantage of the frequent meetings to integrate various types of training and improve microfinance outcomes. Integrating trainings on health or good business practices with group meetings poses a unique opportunity to deliver these services at minimal cost, but requires clients to spend more time at regular meetings, potentially leading to a higher dropout rate.

 
Context of the Evaluation: 

Of Peru’s 29 million people, almost half live in poverty,1 and microfinance institutions (MFIs) hope to improve the socio-economic situation of this population through the promotion of village banking. FINCA Peru, a small, non-profit, but financially sustainable MFI that has been operating in Peru since 1993 creates village banks for poor, female microentrepreneurs, giving them access to formal financial services. Their clients are relatively young, have little formal education and often have families to support. All clients have microenterprises, which may include selling food or handicrafts, or small scale agriculture. FINCA clients each hold, on average, $233 in savings and their average loan is US$203, with a recovery rate of 99%.

 
Details of the Intervention:

Researchers worked with FINCA in Ica and Ayacucho, Peru to measure the marginal impact of adding business training to a group lending program. FINCA sponsored 273 village banks with a total of 6,429 clients, most of whom were women. These banks were divided into treatment groups and comparison groups, with 104 mandatorily participating, 34 voluntarily participating, and 101 as the comparison.

Individuals who held accounts at treatment banks received 22 entrepreneurship training sessions and materials during their normal weekly or monthly banking meeting. Training materials were developed through a collaborative effort between FINCA, Atinchik and Freedom from Hunger and had been used in past projects. Sessions included exercises and discussion with the clients, and a lecture which aimed to improve basic business practices such as how to treat clients, how to use profits, where to sell, and the use of special discounts and credit sales. For example, in one lesson the trainers had each microentrepreneur write out a budget for their enterprise. Comparison groups remained as they were before, meeting with the same frequency to make loan and savings payments. Data was collected on dropout rates, repayment rates, loan size, savings, business size and income to asses the impact of the training.

 
Results and Policy Lessons:

Impact on Business Practices: There was weak evidence that the training may have helped clients identify strategies to increase sales and reduce downward fluctuations: for clients in the treatment group, sales in the month prior to the follow up surveys were 15 percent higher than in the comparison group, and returns were an average 26 percent higher in "bad months" when they would have expected downward fluctuations in their sales. Clients who received business training were significantly more likely to keep records of their account withdrawals, and had better knowledge about business and how to use profits for business growth and innovation. Interestingly, there were actually larger effects for those individuals that expressed less interest in training at the outset of the program. This result implies that demand-driven market solutions may not be as simple as charging for the cost of the services. It is possible that after a free trial, clients with low prior demand would subsequently appreciate its value and demand the service.

Impact on Business Outcomes: This study found little or no evidence of changes in key business outcomes such as business revenue, profits or employment.. For example, the business training had no effect on the number of workers employed at family businesses, did not change the profit margin of the most common products sold at retail businesses, did not increase the number of sales locations, and did not induce entrepreneurs to start new businesses. 

Impact on Institutional Outcomes: Business trainings had effects on some institutional outcomes such as client retention, but not on others such as loan size or accumulated savings. Perfect repayment among treatment groups was three percentage points higher than among comparison groups. Treatment group clients were four percentage points less likely to drop out of the program (either permanently or temporarily) than were comparison group clients, although the proportion of client dropout still remained high in the treatment group, where 59 percent of clients left their banks at some point during the intervention, compared to 63 percent in the comparison group. The training is costly to run, as it requires labor costs for the organization to train their staff and acquire materials. This constituted a 10 percent increase in FINCA’s costs. However, the improved client retention rate generated significantly more increased net revenue than the marginal cost of providing the training, and so all in all providing business trainings was still a profitable undertaking for FINCA.

1 CIA World Factbook, “Peru,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html.

 
Selected Media Coverage:
Dean Karlan, Martin Valdivia

Trust and Microfinance in Poor Communities in Peru

We evaluate a novel microfinance model in which new customers need to gain sponsorship by an existing customer. We investigate how relationships between individuals and social networks impact repayment behaviour. This individual lending program screens clients and enforces good practices much in the same way as more traditional group lending does, but allows microcredit to be extended to those who might not qualify or be interested in a group liability loan.

See here for a similar study in the Philippines.

Policy Issue: 

Microfinance has generated worldwide enthusiasm as a potential catalyst for economic development and poverty reduction. The success of microcredit in providing access to capital without increasing default rates, despite a lack of physical collateral, was originally attributed to the group liability model, in which groups of people are jointly responsible for one another’s loans. However, as the microfinance industry grows and becomes more competitive, institutions must strive to develop new financing methodologies that keep institutional costs low while also extending access to credit. A major problem in microfinance is reaching borrowers who don’t qualify for or are not interested in communal, group liability, banks. Thus, different microfinance structures are needed that reach the poor with individual loans, while still harnessing some of the screening and enforcement benefits of group lending.

Context of the Evaluation: 

Since returning to democratic leadership in 1980, Peru has struggled to regain economic stability and growth. Currently, 44% of its 29 million people live in poverty.1 This plight has driven many rural residents to the outskirts of Lima in search of work, where they make their homes in self-built shantytowns that surround the city’s center. These shantytowns now contain a large proportion of Lima's inhabitants, and their residents have limited access to formal financial services such as savings accounts or loans. This study is located in fairly diverse shanty communities in Ancash, just north of Lima. The economy of these communities is primarily based on mining of gold, copper and zinc and fishing.

Details of the Intervention: 

In collaboration with PRISMA, a Peruvian NGO offering credit through village banks, researchers designed and implemented a new loan product and administered surveys to 9,000 shantytown households. This program sought to use social connections to screen for responsible clients, outside of the traditional group lending model, by requiring new clients to match up with sponsors who were already bank clients in order to obtain a loan.

Existing communal bank members acted as a pool of potential sponsors who can cosign small, individual loans for residents of the community who are not already bank members. The sponsor was responsible for repaying a loan if the client defaulted, and thus they were incentivized to cosign with more responsible individuals whom they could easily monitor. Each adult household member in the village received a card, which outlined the rules of the program and included a list of all sponsors in the community as well as a map of the community showing sponsor location. Both spouses of a sponsoring household and a borrowing household had to act as co-signers.

The two pilot shantytown communities consisted of 282 households with 26 sponsors, and 371 households with 25 sponsors, respectively. Social network surveys conducted in the communities before the implementation of the loan program allowed researchers to map the relationships between clients and sponsors. Researchers measured the strength of connections between individuals by time spent together per week, and whether individuals were considered trustworthy. Interest rates were randomly assigned between 3% and 5% a month across all client-sponsor pairs, in order determine whether the interest rate or the social distance from one’s sponsor had a greater impact on the likelihood of default.

Results and Policy Lessons: 

Reporting early results from the two pilot communities, researchers found that close social relationships and geographic closeness between sponsor and client effectively improves trust between agents, reducing the likelihood of default and the risk of cosigning such a loan. Estimates of the relative effectiveness of interest rates and social connections at reducing defaults suggest that lending with a close neighbor reduces the likelihood of default by the same amount as a 3-4 point decrease in the interest rate.

These findings underscore the prediction on which the program was founded, namely that borrowers with close social relationships to their sponsors allow the bank to be more certain that this new client will repay their loan. Increased information from close social relationships ensures the sponsor, and thus the lender, knows what risk each client represents, and can act to minimize that risk. This individual program therefore effectively screens clients and enforces good practices much in the same way group lending does, and allows microcredit to be extended to those who might not qualify or be interested in a group liability loan.

1 CIA World Factbook, “Peru,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html.

Dean Karlan, Markus M. Möbius

Psychological Responses to Microfinance Loan Recovery Strategies in Peru

Microfinance clients are usually too poor to offer any property as collateral, so micro-lenders use alternative methods to encourage repayment. The most common methods are: (1) threatening to not offer loans in the future to clients who default and (2) using peer pressure mechanisms to ensure that borrowers repay. 

We have partnered with PRISMA to identify ways to implement these methods more effectively. PRISMA has recently deployed a new strategy in its individual loan program for loan recovery that involves sending written notifications to defaulters. This strategy makes use of both the promise that good payers can receive additional loans from PRISMA in the future and the pressure that loan recipients face from their loan guarantors.

Details of the Intervention:

In the study, clients are randomly assigned to two groups. Two thirds of the clients receive written notifications if they fall in default (treatment group), while the rest of the clients do not receive any additional written notifications (control group). Within the treatment group, clients receive letters with either "gain" or "loss" frames, telling the client either that rectifying his credit standing will allow him access to credit in the future or telling him that his continued default will keep him from accessing loans in the future and threatening legal action. Additionally, in some cases both the sponsor and the client receive a letter, while in other cases only the client does.

Results:

The study followed PRISMA´s loan clients from March 2006 to January 2008. We found that letters significantly reduce default rates and are most effective when messages with a loss frame are sent to both clients and their guarantors.

Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Jonathan Zinman

Health Education for Microcredit Clients in Peru

Policy Issue:

Health and education are areas affected by poverty.  Households with limited resources face barriers affording quality education and seeking access to health information.  As microfinance has become a popular development tool, its services have expanded to address other issues associated with poverty.   Credit with Education is one model that provides microfinance clients with training services. By simultaneously addressing needs for financial services and health information, these programs attempt to create synergistic positive effects on clients and their families.

Context:

Peru is a developing country rife with healthcare challenges. According to the World Health Organization, children have a 25% chance of dying before reaching the age of 5[1]. A lack of knowledge about preventable illness like diarrhea and access to immunization contributes to poor health status of vulnerable families.

PRISMA,  a microfinance institution lending to over 20,000 clients, partnered with IPA to provide microfinance with health education[2].  Freedom from Hunger, an NGO that provides supportive services for the poor, provided guidance to PRISMA in developing an education program based on its worldwide Credit with Education module.

Description of the Intervention:

PRISMA village banks were randomly assigned to either a treatment or comparison group. During eight monthly bank meetings, villagers belonging to treatment banks received health education trainings from loan officers, trained by Freedom from Hunger and PRISMA.  The trainings included the following topics focusing on child and maternal health: common childhood illnesses, four danger signals (e.g. diarrhea, cough, fever), medical exams, indicators of quality medical visits, and care for sick children. Surveys administered before and after the trainings collected data on height, weight and hemoglobin ( to measure anemia), days absent from work due to illness, and child nutrition patterns. Institutional outcomes like client retention and repayment rates were also measured.

Results and Policy Lessons:

Adults who received the health education training had significantly higher levels of knowledge of module content than those in the comparison group.   There was no impact on health outcomes for children or institutional outcomes.


[1]World Health Organization, “Peru,” http://www.who.int/countries/per/en/.

[2]Prisma, “Microfinanzas, ” http://www.prisma.org.pe/#cabecera.

Rita Hamad, Dean Karlan

Ultra Poor Graduation Pilot in Peru

Can an intensive package of support lift the ultra poor out of extreme poverty to a more stable state? This 24-month program provides beneficiaries with a holistic set of services including: livelihood trainings, productive asset transfers, consumption support, savings plans, and healthcare. By investing in this multifaceted approach, the program strives to eliminate the need for long-term safety net services. Spanning seven countries on three continents, the Ultra Poor Graduation program is being piloted around the globe. IPA is conducting randomized evaluations in India, Pakistan, Honduras, Peru, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Ghana to understand the impact of this innovative model.

Policy Issue: 

Governments have often attempted to address the needs of the ultra poor by offering consumption support that is costly and offers no clear pathway out of food insecurity. The Ultra Poor Graduation Pilots attempt to apply a model, developed by BRAC in Bangladesh, which recognizes that the ultra poor need the "breathing space" that is provided by temporary consumption support, but that public funds may be better used to build households’ capacities to maintain a sustainable livelihood. The idea is that this initial assistance, lasting two years, will place households securely on the first rung of the development ladder, which they can then climb with the help of appropriate development strategies. The model incorporates a comprehensive package of services: a productive asset (such as chickens or goats), consumption support, livelihood trainings, healthcare, and financial services.Ideally this wide set of support services will help households to weather any shocks they may face along during their climb out of ultra poverty.

This project is a part of a set of evaluations, in partnership with CGAP and the Ford Foundation, that intends to determine whether the model, pioneered in Bangladesh, is effective in a range of contexts.

Context of the Evaluation: 

The study takes place in rural communities of the Canas and Acomayo provinces in the Department of Cusco, Peru.  To assist ultra poor households with young children in the region, Juntos, a government-run conditional cash transfer program, provides families with a monthly stipend. Arariwa and Plan, the project partners, are implementing the Graduation Model in concert with the Juntos program.

Details of the Intervention:

The project team will use a Participatory Wealth Ranking (PWR) to target the ultra poor in the chosen provinces. As overlap is expected between the Ultra Poor Graduation project beneficiaries and Juntos beneficiaries, the project will provide a nine-month cash stipend equivalent to US$35 to those not already receiving it from Juntos.

This program will then build on the base of the Juntos program by providing all beneficiary households with a productive asset, which over two years, they will be trained to manage. During this time period, beneficiaries will be monitored with weekly visits intended to contribute to the holistic development of the family's economic potential. A microfinance promoter will also encourage beneficiaries to save in group mechanisms. At the end of the two year period, Arariwa will offer microcredit products to the beneficiary families that demonstrate characteristics of reliable clients.

In total, 80 communities will participate in the study. Three groups will be defined within these communities:

(A) Treatment households: an average of 20 treatment households will be selected in each of 40 treatment communities.
(B) Neighbors: an average of 20 comparison households will be selected from each of the same 40 treatment communities, for comparison against their neighbors who received the treatment.
(C) Comparison households: an average of 20 comparison households will be selected in each of 40 comparison communities.

The impact of the program can be assessed by comparing groups A and B or by comparing groups A and C. The two comparisons will give different answers if spillover effects are present.

Results:

Results forthcoming.

For additional information on the Ultra Poor Graduation Pilots, click here.

Dean Karlan, Bram Thuysbaert

Cosignatory Requirement as a Barrier for Women Accessing Credit in Peru

Microfinance institutions have long targeted women as recipients due to the belief that women more reliably pay back their loans and the increased access to funds serves to improve women's decision-making power in the household. However, some institutions implement a co-signature requirement in order for women to take out a microfinance loan. This may be acting as a barrier for women to access credit.

IPA has partnered with Microfinanzas PRISMA, an MFI in Peru, to identify the implications of the cosignatory requirement. The study is set up in four agencies in the Peruvian Highlands: Huancayo, Huaraz, Juliaca and Tarma. Through a geographic randomization of districts, the study divides all new communal banks in these areas into two groups: 1. The control group, in which the cosignatory requirement remains the same, and 2. The treatment group, in which the cosignatory requirement is removed. The study will use a baseline and follow-up survey to analyze whether the removal of the signature is allowing more people to join the banks and if the default rate is increasing. Other questions from the surveys will be within the realm of household dynamics and bargaining.

Dean Karlan, Melissa Tartari

Experiments to Improve Participation in a Recycling Program in Northern Peru

Economic growth in Latin America has come at the cost of increasingly acute environmental pressures. Expanding trade and consumption has led to increased waste generation and pollution requiring more developed solid waste disposal systems. Markets lack a price mechanism to internalize the environmental cost of this growth.  Policy makers often apply taxes, subsides or other mechanisms to attempt to align private incentives with public environmental preservation. Aside from altering financial incentives, growing evidence from psychology and behavioral economics research shows that behavior can successfully be influenced by leveraging social norms and emotions. 

Policy Issue:

Economic growth in Latin America has come at the cost of increasingly acute environmental pressures. Expanding trade and consumption has led to increased waste generation and pollution requiring more developed solid waste disposal systems. Markets lack a price mechanism to internalize the environmental cost of this growth.  Policy makers often apply taxes, subsides or other mechanisms to attempt to align private incentives with public environmental preservation. Aside from altering financial incentives, growing evidence from psychology and behavioral economics research shows that behavior can successfully be influenced by leveraging social norms and emotions.  

Context:

Over 20,000 tons of solid waste are produced every day in Peru, most of which is dumped in waterways or informal trash heaps, making solid waste management an area of increasing concern for the country. PRISMA, a local NGO, operates a recycling program in Northern Peru whereby it trains and supports workers in forming associations that collect recyclables door to door from participating households. In addition to providing the informal workers with some initial tools and training, PRISMA further assists workers by canvassing the areas of operation to introduce the recyclers to the community and encourage the residents to segregate recyclable and take part in the recycling program. PRISMA was interested in identifying viable strategies to increase program uptake (34% at baseline), and reduce attrition of participating households from the program.

Description of Intervention:

Researchers worked with PRISMA to test a series of information messages aiming to improve take-up and participation its recycling program.

To improve take-up of households in communities where PRISMA planned to expand the program, researchers conducted a randomized evaluation to test the impact of different messages in eliciting program participation.  One week before the first PRISMA canvasser’s visit, a paper flyer was delivered with the a generic message about PRISMA’s program and one of nine specific messages eliciting pressures such as, social norm, peer comparison, conformity, authority, environmental or social benefits to increase participation. Households that owned a cell phone and were willing to share their number (about 35% of the sample) received text messages once a week with the specific message in addition to the flyers. 

With a sample of 1,785 existing participants, researchers tested strategies to reduce program dropout and increase the amount and quality of the recyclables collected. Plastic bins were randomly distributed to households participating in the study. Some bins had a sticker specifying which items could be recycled.  Household that provided cell phone numbers were randomly assigned to receive either a generic or personalized SMS reminders to recycle or to serve as a comparison group without SMS reminders. SMS messages were sent the day before the weekly visit by the recycler, for a period of six weeks. Data collection for this component of the study lasted for eight weeks and included a careful accounting of the quantity and quality of recyclables received.

Results and Policy Lessons:

Results of Treatments on Program Enrollment: The results reveal no statistically significant effects from the different treatment messages. No significant impact on program take-up for the information campaign conducted through flyers alone or through flyers with text messages were found. Messages conveying social norms and applying social pressure were not successful in leveraging behavioral change. Two interpretations for this outcome are proposed by the researchers: a) these messages and norms were not relevant in this context, b) the large presence of informal recyclers operating outside of the program rendered separation of recyclables at the household level a non-issue.

Results of Treatments on Compliance: Households who received plastic bins turned in recyclables 3-8 percent more of the times and produced on average more (about 0.2 kg) and more valuable recyclables (about 0.1 pesos).  This finding suggests that convenience of storing recyclables is a barrier to greater program participation. 

The SMS reminders had no significant impact on the level and quality of participation of households in the program, suggesting that forgetfulness is not a serious constraints among households enrolled in the program. There was no clear difference in recycling compliance between households who received plain bins and those who received bins with explanatory stickers.

Alberto Chong, Dean Karlan, Jeremy Shapiro, Jonathan Zinman

Group vs. Individual Micro-Lending in Peru

One of the most famous innovations of microfinance was the idea of “social collateral” – a way to guarantee the loans of people who have limited physical assets. However, it’s not clear that requiring group liability is actually a good thing. For instance, it can drastically raise the cost of a loan for a good client if she is forced to cover for other loans. Furthermore, it can force someone to guarantee people who take out much larger loans, which may prove to be impossible. It’s possible that, at least for some clients, individual liability loans may be better if the other mechanisms of microfinance (such as social embarrassment of being a debtor) ensure high repayment rates.

IPA ran a study in the Philippines testing this question, and found that repayment rate under individual liability did not go down, while growth increased. We are replicating the study in Peru.

The first phase of the study, in 2010, is to convert pre-existing communal banks (depending on if the group is in a rural area, the associations range from around 8-20 clients who all guarantee each other) to individual liability products, maintaining the rest of the group structure. Depending on the results, it’s possible that as Pro Mujer expands to new regions we’ll test impact with new associations.

We hope to implement financial diaries in the field in order to see, among other things, if clients under different liability structures have different approaches towards repaying their debts.

Dean Karlan

Using Encouragement to Overcome Psychological Barriers to Saving in Peru

This research examines whether bank marketing and communication tools can help individuals save more and, in particular, switch from informal savings vehicles to formal sector methods (e.g., a bank account). In conjunction with Caja Municipal de Ica (CMI), IPA examines various methods of product design, beyond the financial incentive, of encouraging clients to complete their savings commitment.

Policy Issue:

Microfinance has generated worldwide enthusiasm as a possible strategy to help people living in poverty get the resources they need to start a business, receive additional education, or make investments. While much of the focus of microfinance has been on microcredit, formal savings services can also have a dramatic impact on the lives of the poor. Savings are important both as insurance in the case of illness or other economic shocks, and as a way to purchase productive assets. Savings can also substitute the need for loans among clients who have enough funds to finance their expenditures themselves. But savings strategies are less tested than credit services, and microfinance institutions struggle to effectively expand their savings services.

Context of the Evaluation:

The semi-urban poor living in Ica and Ayacucho, cities in southern Peru, often earn income through small enterprises and self-employment. In Ica, agriculture represents the most important industry, while Ayacucho is well known for its artisans and handicrafts. Many of the poor in this part of Peru save through informal means. They often keep savings in their own homes, a practice referred to as a colchón banco (mattress-bank), or join Merry-go-Round savings groups called ROSCAs, where members pool their money into a pot, and each week or month a different member takes home the pot.  Due to their informal nature, both of these savings practices can be risky and unreliable.

Details of the Intervention:

Researchers will examine whether an initiative to promote savings can help individuals save more and switch from informal savings to formal sector methods. The study is implemented by the Caja Ica, a bank designed to serve the needs of poor clients with microsavings and microcredit programs, with program support from Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and technical assistance from COPEME. The Caja Ica is offering a new commitment savings product called “Ahorro Programmado”. Clients who choose to participate in this service commit to saving an amount of their choosing, amounting to at least 20 soles (US$6.50) per month for 6, 12, 18, or 24 months. As an incentive for meeting their savings commitment, clients receive a preferential interest rate of more than twice what the normal interest rate is for savings accounts.

This research will examine various product designs, beyond the already increased financial incentive, to see which are more effective at encouraging clients to complete their savings commitment. Each of the estimated 5,000 clients expected to enroll in the program will be randomly assigned to receive one or more of the following: (1) reminder letters before the due date of their payment, (2) token gifts upon payment to bring forward the "benefit" of saving, (3) positive or negative incentive messages on each deposit slip, or (4) no services, serving as a comparison. This study will determine the commitment device that most effectively encourages clients to meet their savings goals.

Results and Policy Lessons:

Clients began opening bank accounts in February 2006. The last group to be tracked completed their savings commitments in Oct 2007.  Preliminary results indicate that sign-up gifts, letters, and deposit slips all increased the probability that clients would reach their savings goal by several percentage points.  However, negatively framed messages appear to be more effective than the corresponding positive messages in getting people to save.

 

Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Jonathan Zinman

Financial Education Delivered through Radio and Videos among Low-Income Households in Cuzco, Peru

Policy Issue:

Microcredit is often offered in conjunction with client education services, to provide training for clients through the existing infrastructure. Karlan and Valdivia (2008) found that business training for microfinance clients improved business knowledge, practices and revenues for beneficiaries and increased repayment and client retention rates for the institution. Financial literacy is another educational topic that may be effective in improving economic conditions of clients and financial conditions for lenders.  By offering financial trainings with credit, microfinance institutions may help clients to better manage their loan repayment and avoid overindebtedness.  Microfinance institutions may minimize educational costs and improve outreach of the model by using information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as radio and television.

Context of Evaluation:

Arariwa is a NGO based in Cusco, Peru which serves much of Southern Peru.  Arariwa offers livelihood trainings, technical skill development, and microfinance products to clients in these areas. To offer microfinance, Arariwa establishes communal banks that participate in group savings, loans, and educational programs. In an effort to improve client success, Arariwa is utilizing its existing infrastructure to provide financial education.

Description of Intervention:

A total of 666 communal banks were randomly assigned to a treatment group, which received a financial education module, or a comparison group which received education on other topics such as health and self-esteem. 

The financial literacy program consisted of nine monthly training sessions that used both video and radio components to convey lessons.  The sessions, provided during monthly bank meetings, were based off a curriculum adapted from Freedom from Hunger’s (FFH) training modules, and also used short videos (5-7 minutes in length), activities, and moments of reflection to reinforce key concepts.  .  Training sessions lasted 45-minutes  and covered the following topics: creating financial goals and savings plans, investing in business, calculating loan payments, and avoiding default.  After meetings, participants were asked to listen to a 25-minute radio program to reinforce the training content and to complete a set of homework questions. The radio program was broadcast four times a month and presented testimonies from successful Arariwa clients.

Results and Policy Lessons:

Low implementation levels led a discontinuation of the evaluation. After 11 months, only one percent of the communal banks in the treatment group had completed the full training program. Problems faced by the implementer included: little preparation of credit officers to assume facilitation, low attendance levels at training sessions, and delinquency crises requiring credit officers to focus most of the meeting on collecting repayments. ICTs used as complements to the training presented very limited take-up and usage. The video component was often difficult to broadcast during meetings due to challenges in obtaining TV sets and DVD players in rural communities and as a result the median bank only trained with the DVD one time.  Less than seven percent of the members in the treatment group listened regularly to the radio program, despite a set of incentives connected to the program.

Alberto Chong, Dean Karlan, Martin Valdivia
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